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Abstract 
 
This study provides a survey of recent advances in the literature on proposed African 
monetary unions. The survey comprises about 60 empirical papers published during the past 
fifteen years. Four main strands are discussed individually and collectively, notably, the 
proposed: West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), East African Monetary Union (EAMU), 
Southern African Monetary Union (SAMU) and African Monetary Union (AMU). We 
observe a number of issues with establishing the feasibility and/or desirability of potential 
monetary unions, inter alia, variations in: choice of variables, empirical strategies, sampled 
countries and considered periodicities.  We address this ambiguity by reviewing studies with 
scenarios that are consistent with Hegelian dialectics and establish selective expansion as the 
predominant mode of monetary integration. Some proponents make cases for strong pegs and 
institutions as viable alternatives to currency unions. Using cluster analysis, disaggregating 
panels into sub-samples and distinguishing shocks from responses in the examination of 
business cycle synchronisation provide more subtle policy implications. We caution that for 
inquiries using the same theoretical underpinnings, variables and methods just by modifying 
the scope/context and periodicity may only contribute to increasing the number of conflicting 
findings. Authors should place more emphasis on new perspectives and approaches based on 
caveats of, and lessons from the European Monetary Union (EMU) and CFA zones.  
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1. Introduction  
 A substantial proportion of the literature has been documented on the feasibility of 
proposed African monetary unions. Inquiries have been positioned on different countries, 
proxy indicators, periodicities and estimation strategies to assess whether potential currency 
unions are optimal or not. Empirical findings from these studies have been conflicting and 
diverse. The results also appear to be different depending on scope of inquiry, namely: West 
African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), East African   Monetary Union (EAMU), Southern African 
Monetary Union (SAMU) and African Monetary Union (AMU). Hence, corresponding policy 
implications from the plethora of studies may also vary depending on contexts.  
 The above strands in the literature have not been structured to present a holistic 
perspective to policy makers, who arguably need to compare empirical evidence from 
different studies in order to improve their policy choices.  Moreover, findings may also be 
contingent on regional-specific factors like, inter alia: economic integration, politico-
economic histories, varying political and institutional arrangements and cultures (Masson, 
2008).  
 A pilot assessment of the task to be accomplished in this study is in line with our 
expectations of heterogeneity because, we observe a number of issues with establishing the 
feasibility and/or desirability of potential monetary unions, inter alia, variations in choice of 
variables, empirical strategies, sampled countries and considered periodicities.  We address 
this ambiguity by engaging some strands with scenarios that are consistent with Hegelian 
dialectics. These include: (i) a thesis for feasibility; (ii) an anti-thesis when studies do not 
establish feasibility; (iii) a synthesis when conditional feasibility is apparent and (iv) 
justifications for the first-three scenarios. Hence, the feasibility of proposed monetary zones 
on the continent can be summarised into four main perspectives with each having relevant 
and/or specific implications for monetary policy.   
First, a potential monetary union is feasible when (i) it is well designed to be robust in 
the face of a variety of macroeconomic shocks and (ii) candidate countries are converging 
towards some established common criteria. Second, for a potential monetary union to be 
impractical, the opposite criteria enunciated for feasibility should be observed. Third, a 
potential currency union may be both feasible and unfeasible contingent on the 
implementation of certain recommendations. Within this framework, it is established that the 
potential union is not realistic but could be achievable in the future with the formulation and 
implementation of some policies. Fourth, in order to enhance policy prescription, it is relevant 
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to briefly ask why each of the three underlying conclusions might be drawn. The above 
narrative is consistent with Asongu (2013a, 2014a).  
 It is also important to substantiate the above scenarios with some examples. For this 
purpose, we use three studies on the WAMZ published in 2005 to clarify the three scenarios. 
First, Ogunkola (2005) has justified a feasible (or yes) scenario with evidence of increasing 
convergence in Real Exchange Rate (RER). Second, the unfeasible (or no) scenario has been 
established by Debrun et al. (2005) with evidence of fiscal heterogeneity. Third, Bénassy-
Quéré and Coupet (2005) have been ambiguous and have established a yes/no scenario, based 
on correlations in economic growth, debts and trade variables. The authors have 
recommended: (i) an extended West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
without Nigeria, but with Ghana, the Gambia and Sierra Leone, or (ii) the creation of a 
distinct monetary zone with core WAEMU countries, including the Gambia and excluding 
Nigeria. It follows that the WAMZ may be feasible contingent on specific groupings or 
clusters of countries.  
 Another relevant aspect worth elucidating is that underlying heterogeneity in findings 
and corresponding policy recommendations may be traceable to several factors, notably, 
dissimilarities in variables, periodicity, sample and methodology. First, variability in optimal 
currency area (OCA) indicators have already been highlighted above, namely: the real 
exchange rate (RER) fiscal indicators and plethora of macroeconomic variables (economic 
growth, trade and debt). Second, the periodicity employed in the first, second and third 
scenarios of our examples are respectively: 1970-1997, 1996-2000 and 1990-2004. Third, 
samples also differ with focus on: (i) the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) in the first-two scenarios and (ii) 17 African countries in the third scenario. 
Fourth, a calibration model, a RER variability model and cluster analysis are employed in the 
first, second and third scenarios respectively. In light of the above, it becomes apparent that 
the observed heterogeneity in results may be traceable to the substantiated factors.  
 As far as we have reviewed, this is the first line of inquiry to review the literature on 
proposed African monetary zones. We survey studies that have assessed the underlying issue 
covering the period 1964-2010, published during the past 15 years for the most part.  The 
objective of the study is to put some structure on the empirical literature in order to provide 
policymakers with the much needed guidance on the issues. The survey is timely given that 
none of the proposed monetary unions has launched a single currency yet.  The relevance of 
the findings may not be limited to policymakers concerned with the African continent, but 
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could have scope for other comparative economies in Asia and Latin America harbouring 
similar intensions for currency unions.  
 The rest of the survey is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
focusing on the WAMZ, while Section 3 is oriented towards the EAMU. Section 4 tackles 
concerns with the SAMU. We devote space to an AMU in Section 5. Section 6 covers a 
further discussion of results and implications while Section 7 presents concluding lessons.  
 
2. The Proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
 In this section, as summarised in Table 1, we engage a chronological list of empirical 
studies that have focused on assessing the proposed WAMZ by author, periodicity, sampled 
countries, methodology, feasibility and justifications/recommendations. In most studies within 
this strand of the literature, results are mixed with conclusions on viability (Ogunkola, 2005; 
Diop, 2012), impracticality (Debrun et al., 2005; Tsangarides  & Qureshi, 2006; Houssa, 
2008; Cham, 2009; Alagidede et al., 2012; Chuku, 2012; Dufrénot & Sugimoto, 2013; 
Asongu, 2013b, 2014bc ; Harvey & Cushing, 2015) and conditional feasibility (Bénassy-
Quéré & Coupet, 2005; Bangaké, 2008; Ekpoh & Udoh, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Saka et al., 
2015).  
 Ogunkola (2005) is quite optimistic about the viability of a currency zone in the 
ECOWAS region. The author has used a RER variability model to show that the sub-region is 
increasingly closer to a monetary union. According to the narrative, by implementing 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in ECOWAS, governments of countries have 
enhanced the much needed convergence for a  common monetary union. Nonetheless, the 
author is also cautiously optimistic by asserting that there are some tangible variations 
between RER shocks confronted by West African countries of the French Colonies of Africa 
(CFA) zone, relative to their non-CFA counterparts. In this light, the author recommends that 
further convergence is needed in economic policy as well as an alternative to dependence on 
income accruing from taxes generated by international transactions needed for Western 
African monetary integration.   
Debrun et al (2005) have also assessed the potential for monetary integration in 
ECOWAS by employing a model of fiscal and monetary policy interactions. Their results 
show that the proposed currency area is feasible for most non-WAEMU countries, but not for 
the current WAEMU countries.  
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Celasun and Justiniano (2005) have employed a dynamic factor analysis to investigate 
the synchronization of fluctuations in output among ECOWAS member states. The results 
show that small countries are comparatively more harmonized with respect to variations in 
output. In conclusion, the authors have suggested selective monetary unions based on country 
subsets instead of wider monetary integration.  
Cluster analysis has been employed by Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005) to assess the 
optimality of the WAEMU, Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU), 
ECOWAS and WAMZ as common currency zones. The authors have concluded that the CFA 
zone is not an optimal currency area (OCA). They have also sustained that a monetary union 
in ECOWAS, with the inclusion of Nigeria, is not economically practical. According to the 
narrative, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Ghana can align with the WAEMU for a common 
monetary area.  
Using the same empirical underpinnings of cluster analysis, Tsangarides and Qureshi 
(2008) have employed a set of macroeconomic variables to the convergence criteria and OCA 
theory to conclude that WAMZ and WAEMU are significantly heterogeneous. Moreover, 
consistent with Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005), there are substantial dissimilarities 
between WAEMU and CAEMU. Meanwhile, important similarities are apparent between 
WAMZ and CAEMU countries.  
Diop (2007) employs a gravity model on bilateral trade data between ECOWAS 
member states to establish that structural and geographic factors as well as membership within 
the WAEMU substantially influence the intensity of trade relations in Africa. The author 
concludes that a common currency area in the region would increase intra-regional trade and 
further argues that the underlying trade intensity can be further enhanced by placing more 
emphasis on the structural reforms essential for economic diversity, infrastructural 
development and convergence in macroeconomic performance and policies. The 
recommendations of Diop (2007) are consistent with those of Ogunkola (2005) who had 
earlier expressed strong optimism with regards to  the currency union, but also advised on 
further implementation of SAPs in candidate countries.  
 Houssa (2008) has employed a dynamic factor model to show that a monetary union in 
the ECOWAS region would be costly from an economic standpoint based on asymmetric 
evidence of supply shocks between candidate countries. The author has also emphasised that 
the presence of some positive correlation in demand shocks is less relevant than supply 
shocks within a currency area because of its temporal effect on output.  
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Masson (2006, 2008) have engaged in a cost-benefit analysis for West Africa, with 
particular emphasis on the concern about endogeneity. The author has concluded that, 
whereas a monetary zone could engender substantial trade impacts among potential member 
states, it is feasible for countries within ECOWAS to form a currency union without Nigeria, 
which might be relatively better-off compared to other countries.  
 The findings of Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet (2005) have been confirmed by Bangaké 
(2008) who has investigated the nexus between bilateral exchange rate viability and OCA-
related indicators. The authors, while emphasising that Ghana could be included in the 
WAEMU, are strongly against the involvement of Nigeria in the WAMZ or extension of the 
WAEMU to include Nigeria.  
 Alagidede et al. (2012) have used cointegration methods and fractional integration to 
investigate inflation dynamics and common tendencies in the real domestic product of 
candidate countries in the WAMZ, to establish evidence of substantial heterogeneity. In the 
same year and for the same ECOWAS region, Chuku (2012) has emphasised that, compared 
to external shocks that are symmetric, internal shocks are likely to be asymmetric. According 
to the author, about 85 percent of correlations in demand, supply and monetary shocks within 
the sub-region are asymmetric, whereas external or real exchange rate shocks have a 
symmetric tendency. The findings of Chuku align with those of Debrun et al. (2015), 
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008), Houssa (2008) and Alagidede et al. (2012)  illustrated a 
questionable OCA that is an embodiment of all candidate countries in the sub-region.  
 
Table 1: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Ogunkola (2005) 1970-1997 ECOWAS A RER variability 
model 
Yes  Growing RER convergence  
Debrun et al. (2005) 
 
1996-2000 ECOWAS A calibration model No Presence of fiscal 
heterogeneity  
Bénassy-Quéré & 
Coupet (2005) 
1986-1999 17 Sub-Saharan African 
countries(CAEMC, 
WAEMU, WAMZ and 
ECOWAS) 
Clustering analysis Yes/No Yes with Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone  
Diop (2012) 1997-2004 ECOWAS Gravity model Yes  Substantial gains in trade 
Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2008) 
1990-2004 ECOWAS  Clustering analysis No Dissimilar economic 
characteristics between 
WAMZ and WAEMU 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  system of 
simultaneous 
equations and GMM 
Yes/No Yes with Ghana, No with 
Nigeria 
Houssa (2008) 1966-2000 ECOWAS VAR No Asymmetry of supply 
shocks 
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  ECOWAS Welfare gain analysis Yes/No Selective expansion 
Cham (2009). 1980-2005 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria  
No Significant absence of 
convergence  
Alagidede et al.  (2012) 1961-2010 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone  
Fractional integration 
and cointegration  
No  Heterogeneity in inflation 
and economic trends 
Chuku (2012) 1970-2010 ECOWAS Symmetry and/or No Costs (asymmetry) outweigh 
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asymmetry of 
responses to 
macroeconomic 
shocks.  
benefits (symmetry of 
shock). 
Ekpoh & Udoh (2013) 2005-2010 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria. 
Yes/No Yes, but at the price of 
monetary policy. 
ineffectiveness is boosting 
output.  
Coulibaly & 
Gnimassoun (2013) 
1985-2009 ECOWAS  Convergence and co-
movements between 
exchange rate 
misalignments. 
Yes/No  The WAEMU could be 
joined by Ghana and 
Gambia.  
Dufrénot & Sugimoto 
(2013) 
1999-2008 ECOWAS Counterfactual 
analyses and 
simulations.  
No  Simulations show little 
support for a dominant peg.  
Asongu (2013b) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
Granger causality  No Non-traditional monetary 
policy instruments.  
Asongu (2014a) 1980-2009 The Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Cointergration and 
VECM 
Yes/No Evidence of cointegration 
but with dissimilar nexus of 
fundamental with the 
equilibrium.   
Asongu (2014b) 1981-2009 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
GMM No Lack of real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence. 
Asongu (2014c) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
VAR No Ineffective monetary 
policies.   
Saka et al. (2015) 2000-2008 ECOWAS Panel least squares 
and beta convergence.  
Yes/No Evidence of income 
convergence but more 
integration is needed.  
Harvey & Cushing 
(2015) 
1987-2011 Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone 
Structural VAR, 
impulse-response and 
variance 
decomposition.  
No Uncommon sources of 
shocks and asymmetric 
responses to common 
shocks. 
      
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. RER: Real Exchange Rate. CAEMC: Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community. WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. GMM: Generalised Method of Moments. VECM: Vector Error 
Correction Model. VAR: Vector autoregression.  
 
Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013) have employed a new methodology to assess the 
optimality of a monetary union in West Africa. Using an estimation technique based on catch-
up, co-movements between misalignments in exchange and cluster analysis, the findings show 
that the WAEMU which is the most homogeneous zone in Western and Central Africa can be 
joined by the Gambia and Ghana and to a lesser extent Sierra Leone. Moreover, Senegal and 
Ghana are referenced nations for the creation of such a monetary union. The exclusion of 
Nigeria by Coulibaly and Gnimassoun concurs with previous literature.  
 Counterfactual analyses and estimation of a dependent-economy model for small 
commodity-exporting nations is used to compare various nominal anchors that boost external 
and internal competitiveness in the  event of fixed exchange regimes within ECOWAS 
(Dufrénot and Sugimoto, 2013). Four anchor currencies are considered, namely: the yen, US 
dollar, the euro and the yuan. Corresponding simulation findings show little support for a 
dominant peg in the region if the following goals are to be pursued in the potential monetary 
union. They are: (i) minimization of exchange rate variability, (ii) maximization of export 
revenues and (iii) stabilization and minimization of RER misalignments based on fundamental 
value.   
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 Ekpoh and Udoh (2013) focus on what is required to enhance the process of 
monetary integration by providing an analytical perspective of the costs of  monetary union 
stability, notably the loss of country-specific ability to use  monetary policy to stimulate 
aggregate productivity. The authors further argue that, economic policy coordination and 
channels of effective risk-sharing would improve a  monetary union’s consolidation 
process.  
As in the case of Dufrénot and Sugimoto (2013), Asongu (2013b) has also stimulated 
an inquiry with externalities like the recent Euro crisis. His short-run Schumpeterian trip to 
the embryonic WAMZ with Granger causality reveals bleak findings for the region, 
essentially because corresponding  results are consistent with the non-traditional strand of 
monetary regimes for which appropriate policy instruments cannot be used in the short-run to 
offset adverse output shocks. Within the same framework of the euro crisis hunting 
embryonic African monetary zones, Asongu (2014a) has shown that the long-run behaviour of 
real exchange rate in the WAMU can be explained by changes in productivity, terms of trade, 
openness, investment and debts. Moreover, the author finds evidence of stable error correction 
mechanisms, with four out of five long-run relationships having the correct signs. He has 
however expressed some scepticism based on further evidence of substantial cross-country 
disparities in connections between RER and macroeconomic fundamentals. Asongu (2014b) 
has extended Asongu (2014a) by investigating convergence in real, monetary and fiscal 
policies to conclude on a substantial absence in the much needed catch-up for policy 
harmonization. Asongu (2014c) further extends Asongu (2014ab) by analysing the impacts of 
monetary policy on economic activity in the region to establish that the proposed WAMZ 
cannot employ policy instruments to dampen adverse output shocks by either pursuing a 
contractionary or an expansionary policy.  
Using a methodology based on the convergence criteria, Saka et al. (2015) established 
evidence of income convergence. They concluded that more integration would enhance the 
objectives of long-term steady growth among countries. Differences between the findings of 
Saka et al. (2015) and Asongu (2014b) may be traceable to variations in periodicity and 
methodology. A structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR) is employed by Harvey and 
Cushing (2015) to find that: (i) common sources of shocks are not apparent in a zone due to 
diverse country-specific economic structures, (ii) the correlation of underlying structural 
shocks reveals that countries would have different responses to a common monetary policy 
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owing to asymmetric responses to common demand, monetary and supply shocks and (iii) a 
common monetary union is neither feasible immediately nor in the short-term.  
 As we have observed from Ekpoh and Udoh  (2013), some lines of inquiry are more 
focused on providing requirements needed for the transition to a common monetary union, as 
opposed to directly engaging in the debate on whether a currency union is feasible or not. This 
is the case with Quah (2015) who has evaluated the appropriateness of WAEMU forming a 
currency zone by concluding that, of the world’s three largest economies dominating in the 
region, the emerging Chinese yuan is preferable to the euro as peg or monetary anchor. 
   
3. The Proposed East African Monetary Union (EAMU) 
  
 In this section, we summarise empirical studies on the proposed EAMU in a 
chronology that is consistent with Hegelian dialectics, notably: (i) a thesis on studies 
presenting a case for the monetary union (Mkenda, 2001; Bangaké, 2008; Asongu, 2013b), 
(ii) an anti-thesis  on papers that have recommended against the common currency area 
(Buigut, 2011; Rusuhuzwa & Masson, 2012; Davoodi et al., 2013; Mafusire  & Brixiova, 
2013; Lepetit et al., 2014; Asongu, 2014bc) and  (iii) a synthesis for inquiries that have 
presented  a case for the monetary zone, contingent on substantial policy efforts from 
candidate countries (Buigui & Valev, 2005 ; Falagiarda,  2010; Kishor & Ssozi, 2011; Sheik 
et al., 2011). From an initial assessment, like with the case of the WAMU, we find that 
empirical results and corresponding recommendations differ by authors, periodicity, sampled 
countries and methodology.  
 In the first strand of the thesis, Mkenda (2001) has employed a Generalized 
Purchasing Power Parity (GPPP) model to examine the suitability of the EAC (East African 
Community) for a common monetary zone. The findings suggest that the EAMU is an OCA 
because RERs between candidate countries were cointegrated during the period 1980-1998. It 
is important to note that Mkenda used a sample of old EAC, which excludes Burundi and 
Rwanda. In a similar vein, Bangaké (2008) has used the same sample with a different 
periodicity and methodology to establish findings that are consistent with those of Mkenda 
(2001) when Burundi and Rwanda are excluded from the current EAC sample. More recently, 
Asongu (2013b) has taken a short-run Schumpeterian trip to the EAMU using Granger 
causality to conclude that the region is a feasible one for a monetary union because it is 
consistent with discretionary policy arrangements. In other words, in the short-term, monetary 
policy instruments can be employed to offset adverse shocks to output.  
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 There are relatively more studies in the second strand on the anti-thesis, documenting 
papers which have concluded that the EAMU is unworkable. There are seven studies in this 
strand.  
First, Buigut (2011) has used techniques of cointegration to assess if candidate 
members of the EAC make-up a feasible monetary union. Using exchange rates and monetary 
base, the study concludes that there is  an existence of partial convergence. Hence, a fast-track 
process would entail considerable cost for the candidate countries. The authors recommend 
that potential member states engage in substantial adjustments in order to align their monetary 
policies with some tolerance in policy coordination in order to enhance the convergence 
needed for a sustainable monetary union.  
Second, Rusuhuzwa and Masson (2012) have shown that countries in the EAC 
substantially differ in terms of  asymmetry shocks and structures of production. They 
conclude that the building of effective institutions for enforcing fiscal discipline and enabling 
macroeconomic surveillance are essential. According to them, instead of fast-tracking the 
process, introducing a common basket currency in parallel with national currencies is 
recommendable.  
Third, policy recommendations from Buigut (2011) and Rusuhuzwa and Masson 
(2012) which have been positioned on a fast-track process for the year 2012 should have been 
taken into account by policy makers. This is essentially because Mafusire and Brixiova (2013) 
have positioned their inquiry on the adoption of a single currency in the region by 2015. They 
concluded on the absence of macroeconomic convergence and argued that a quick transition 
to a currency area is not advisable. They recommend, structural reforms, entailing the 
bridging of infrastructural gaps and policy harmonization that would enhance business cycle 
management.  
 Fourth, Davoodi et al. (2013) investigate whether monetary policy can be employed 
to influence output and inflation in the EAC to establish that the currency union is unworkable 
because: (i) Monetary Transmission Mechanisms (MTM) are conflicting depending on 
whether statistical inferences are standard or non-standard and (ii) in the presence of MTM, 
their relevance differ across countries. Moreover, mainstream policy instruments such as the 
interest rate and reserve capital are ineffective.  
 Fifth, a stylized model that allows for uncertainty rewards from fiscal, financial and 
monetary stability has been employed by Lepetit et al. (2014) to conclude that, in the presence 
of uncertainty, only Rwanda might prefer a monetary union on the grounds of fiscal stability. 
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The authors further recommend robust institutional arrangements for improvements in fiscal, 
monetary and financial stability.  
Sixth,  Asongu (2014b) assesses convergence in real, monetary and fiscal policies. He 
remarked that the harmonisation which is needed for policy harmonization is lacking.  
Seventh, as an extension, Asongu (2014c) has concluded that there is general 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy in influencing economic activity (or output and prices). 
The findings are broadly aligned with those of Davoodi et al. (2013) and are also positioned 
on the use of monetary policy instruments to manage economic activity.  
 
Table 2: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed East African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Mkenda (2001) 1980-1998 Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda  
Generalized Purchasing Power 
Parity (GPPP) model. 
Yes Cointegrated real exchange 
rates between member states. 
Buigut & Valev 
(2005) 
1970-2001 Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Burundi, 
Rwanda (EAC)  
Structural vector autoregressive 
analysis.  
No  Asymmetric demand and 
supply shocks.  
Yes, with 
more 
integration 
Similar speed and magnitude 
in adjustment of shocks.  
Bangaké 
(2008) 
1990-2003 21 African countries  System of simultaneous 
equations and GMM. 
Yes Yes for Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda (structural 
similarities). 
Buigut & Valev 
(2009) 
1990-2004 EAC Simulation of welfare effects 
from a monetary union 
Not definite  Mutual restraint in monetary 
policy is a potential benefit. 
Falagiarda 
(2010) 
1990-2006 EAC Cointegration analysis.  Yes/No Single currency viable but 
currently doubtful. 
Buigut (2011) 1997-2008 EAC Cointegration techniques on 
exchange rates and monetary 
base. 
No Only partial convergence. 
Kishor & Ssozi 
(2011) 
1970-2007 EAC Unobserved component model 
and time-varying parameter 
model. 
Yes/No Increased but weak business 
cycle synchronisation since 
2000. 
Sheik et al. 
(2011) 
1980-2010 EAC  Cross country correlation and 
variance analysis. 
Yes/No Similar business patterns, 
but for Rwanda.  
Rusuhuzwa & 
Masson (2012) 
1990-2010 EAC Correlation and cointegration 
of business cycle and shocks. 
No Substantial asymmetric 
shocks and production 
structures.  
Davoodi et al. 
(2013) 
2000-2010 EAC Structural vector auto-
regression analysis (SVAR)  
No Weak Monetary Policy 
Transmission Mechanism.  
Asongu 
(2013b) 
1980-2010 EAC Granger causality.  Yes Traditional monetary policy 
instruments.  
Mafusire  & 
Brixiova 
(2013) 
1980-2009 EAC  SVAR No Lack of macroeconomic 
convergence.  
Lepetit et al. 
(2014) 
2003-2010 EAC Stylised model of 
policymakers' decision 
problem  
No  Uncertainty does not allow 
for monetary and financial 
stability.  
Asongu 
(2014b) 
1981-2009 EAC GMM No Lack of real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence. 
Asongu 
(2014c) 
1980-2010 EAC VAR No Ineffective  
Monetary policies.   
      
Notes. VAR: Vector autoregressions. GMM: Generalised Method of Moments.  
 
 The third strand on synthesis (yes/no scenario) is an embodiment of four major 
studies. They are motivated by the emphasis of Angeloni and Dedola (1999) on the need to 
distinguish shocks from responses, Buigut and Valev (2005) have built on weaknesses of 
previous methodologies (e.g that used by Mkenda, 2001) to adopt one that separates errors 
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from responses. Their findings show: (i) asymmetric demand and supply shocks and (ii) the 
speed and magnitude of adjustments to shocks are symmetric across countries. Based on this 
evidence, enhanced integration among candidate states could provide a favourable framework 
for a monetary union in the EAC. Besides,  by assessing some traditional optimum currency 
areas, criteria and employing cointergration analysis to investigate the behaviour of real 
exchange rate Falagiarda (2010) has suggested that, whereas a common currency area in the 
region is a viable option, there are some statistical and country-specific anomalies that raise 
some doubts on quality of findings. Additionally, Kishor and Ssozi (2011) have used 
synchronization of the business cycle as criteria of optimum currency area to conclude that, 
while the rate of harmonization has increased since the EAC Treaty was enforced in the year 
2000, the degree of interrelatedness is still relatively weak, given that the proportion of shocks 
common to candidate states is still small. On the same basis of business cycle co-ordination, 
Sheik et al. (2011) have used extracted business trends and cycles to examine correlations and 
variances of annual GDP data. The findings show that four EAC nations (with the exception 
of Rwanda) exhibit similar tendencies in business patterns. They concluded that while these 
countries have similar cycle and transitory components, they display differences in permanent 
components of the growth tendency.  
 As with the preceding section on the WAMZ, some studies have not directly focused 
on assessing the feasibility of the EAMU, but aligned with the principal investigation of 
factors that can enhance the process of consolidation. In this vein, Buigut and Valev (2009) 
built on their previous study to caution that the exercise of mutual restraint on monetary 
policy is paramount for potential rewards from a common currency in the EAC.  
 
4.  Southern African Monetary Union (SAMU) 
 
Consistent with the narrative of the previous section, we review studies on the 
proposed SAMU with Hegelian dialectics, namely:  (i) a thesis on studies presenting a case 
for the monetary union (Grandes, 2003; Debrun & Masson, 2013), (ii) an anti-thesis  for 
works that have recommended against the common currency area (Agdeyegbe, 2009) and  
(iii) a synthesis on inquiries that present a case for a  monetary zone contingent on substantial 
efforts from candidate countries (Khamfula & Huizinga, 2004; Jefferis, 2007; Wang et al., 
2007; Bangaké, 2008; Masson, 2008; Zehirun et al., 2015). As  with previous sections, the 
findings are conditional on a number of factors, namely periodicity, methodology and 
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sampled countries. We also notice that studies in the strand on synthesis are substantially 
more than the two other parts combined.  
 In the first aspect, Grandes (2003)  assessed two main concerns, notably on: (i) 
whether the Common Monetary Area (CMA) in Southern Africa is an optimum currency area 
(OCA) and (ii) the benefits and costs experienced by countries participating in the CMA. The 
author confirmed the existence of a significant evidence of combined positive impact 
resulting from higher levels of openness and common diversification. According to the 
econometrics finding, the CMA (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) form an 
OCA based on the presence of common long-term tendencies in their bilateral real exchange 
rates.  Ten years after, Debrun and Masson (2013) presented a quantitative investigation of 
welfare impacts from the CMA (that is extended with some groups of SADC countries) to 
advise that: (i) all CMA members would benefit from participating, (ii) joining the CMA by 
SADC members is beneficial to all, with the exceptions of Angola, Tanzania and Mauritius 
and (iii) a SADC-wide symmetric currency area continues to be beneficial for all, without 
Mauritius.  
 In the second strand on anti-thesis, Agdeyegbe (2009) assessed the optimality of a 
currency area in the SADC through the prism of inflation and nominal exchange rate 
convergence. Based on time-varying parameters, there is strong evidence of non-convergence 
in consumer price inflation and nominal exchange rates, which indicates that SADC is not yet 
ready to satisfy criteria similar to  the Maastricht-type for the Euro.  
 The area on the synthesis or papers documenting feasibility based on some 
reservations entails four main studies. They comprised (1) Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) 
have used the GARCH model to assess the real exchange rate (vis-à-vis South Africa) in order 
to elucidate divergences in fiscal and monetary policies. The findings show that monetary 
integration would considerably eliminate real exchange rate  variations owing to country-
specific monetary policies. However, the study has also cautioned that it is not recommended 
that  all SADC members form a currency union because corresponding costs outweigh 
benefits. (2) Wang et al. (2007) have employed convergence, and adjustment analyses to 
conclude that while there is evidence of integration, more symmetric responses to shocks are 
required. (3) Jefferis (2007)  investigated the extent to which fundamental monetary and 
economic indicators (inflation, exchange rates and interest rates) are converging within the 
SADC. He advised that a core convergence group in the CMA consists of Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa and Swaziland, including, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and Tanzania. The 
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non-converging group includes Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia. The author also notes some heterogeneity within the convergence 
groups, notably in: (i) full labour and capital mobility, (ii) intra-regional trade and (iii) 
substantial political constraints.  (4) Bangaké (2008)  established that reasonable structural 
catch-up is present between Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia. The author  concluded that a 
monetary union embodying these three countries would be associated with less cost. This 
finding is contrary to previous results by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) which stressed the 
feasibility of a monetary union within SADC that included Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. (5) Countries in Southern Africa have also been studied by Zehirun et al. 
(2015) who joined the previous narratives in concluding that a SADC monetary union is 
feasible without Angola and Mauritius. 
 
Table 3: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed Southern African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Grandes (2003) 
 
1990-2001 Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, Swaziland , 
South Africa 
Cointegration and 
cost/benefit analysis. 
Yes Common long-run trends.  
Khamfula & Huizinga 
(2004)  
1980-1996 SADC GARCH Model to 
assess disturbances in 
RER.  
Yes/No 
 
Yes for South Africa, 
Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. 
Khamfula & Mensteab 
(2004). 
1995-1999 SAMU (Southern 
African Monetary 
Union) 
Cost and Benefit 
analysis.  
Not definite  Structural adjustment 
policies are needed to 
enhance integration 
needed for the SAMU. 
Jefferis (2007) 1990-2002 SADC Macroeconomic and 
monetary convergence. 
Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Wang et al. (2007) 1980-2005 CMA Integration, 
convergence, shock and 
adjustment analyses. 
Yes/No Evidence of integration 
but more symmetric 
responses to shocks are 
needed. 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  System of simultaneous 
equations and GMM. 
Yes/No Yes for Malawi, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.  
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  SADC Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No Selective expansion. 
Agdeyegbe (2009) 1992-2000 SADC  Estimating time-varying 
convergence 
parameters.  
No  Non convergence in 
exchange rate and 
inflation.  
Debrun & Masson 
(2013) 
1994-2010 SADC Welfare gain analysis. Yes  Most members would 
benefit. 
Zehirun et al. (2015) 
 
1995-2012 11 SADC member 
countries  
Cointegration and 
VECM. 
Yes, without 
Angola and 
Mauritius.  
Generalised Purchasing 
Power Parity (GPPP) 
hypothesis holds.  
      
Notes. SADC: Southern African Development Community. CMA: Common Monetary Area. GARCH: Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity. RER: Real Exchange Rate.  
 
 In accordance with the atypical discourse in previous sections, some studies have not 
specifically focused on assessing the feasibility of the SAMU. Within this framework, 
Khamfula and Mensteab (2004) have examined the sources of benefits and costs as well as the 
role SAPs played in enhancing the convergence process. They established that compliance 
with current SAPs would heighten the rate of economic integration needed for a monetary 
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union within the SADC. There are some concerns however, notably regarding, the elusiveness 
of whether: (i) conducive SAPs should be maintained and (ii) all member states would accept 
them.  
 
5. African Monetary Union (AMU) 
  
 Heterogeneity in African countries has brought about an important concern of 
geography in the objective of currency unions, first raised by Masson and Patillo (2004). 
Consistent with Coulibaly and Gnimassoun (2013), we argue here that due to economic 
asymmetries, it is relevant to investigate potential suitable geographical zones that can form a 
monetary area in Africa.  
In accordance with the discourse in previous sections, we also present in this section 
on the AMU with the Hegelian dialectic, which embodies: (i) a thesis on studies presenting a 
case for the AMU (Guillaume & Stasavage, 2000; Tsangarides et al., 2006); (ii) an anti-thesis 
against it (Bayoumi & Ostry, 1997; Karras, 2007) and (iii) syntheses on works that have 
documented a case for the AMU with some strong reservations (Yehoue, 2005; Buigut, 2006; 
Buigut & Valev, 2006; Masson, 2006, 2008; Debrun et al., 2011; Tsangarides & Qureshi, 
2015). Still in line with previous sections, the findings are conditional on a number of factors, 
notably: periodicity, methodology and sampled countries. As in the case of SAMU, we also 
observe that works in the strand on synthesis are substantially more than those in the two 
other elements combined.  
 To the best of our knowledge, the first strand begins with Guillaume and Stasavage 
(2000) who have argued that African nations are short of the efficient political institutions 
needed for a credible commitment to financial stability. They argue that an alternative means 
to sound commitment towards macroeconomic policies can be provided with the help of 
monetary unions. The conditions required for this sound commitment include,  among others: 
(i) the design of monetary unions to maximise effective enforcement of monetary rules, (ii) 
that exit should be structurally costly and (iii) that states seeking to break the rules should be 
severely sanctioned. Tsangarides et al. (2006) have shown with the help of a gravity model 
that membership to a currency union would be rewarding to Africa as a whole, especially in 
terms of increased trade.  
 The second strand on anti-thesis also comprises two studies. Bayoumi and Ostry 
(1997) who investigated whether current (and substantially fractured) currency arrangements 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are consistent with the theory of optimum currency area  After 
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analysing the correlation of intra-regional trade and real cross-country disturbances, the 
findings show little evidence that countries in SSA would be rewarded by larger currency 
unions in the near future. In another study, Karras (2007) has assessed the macroeconomic 
benefits and costs of adopting a single currency in thirty-seven African countries. The author 
finds that, based on estimated costs and benefits, some countries have more to gain (Ghana, 
Uganda and Guinea) and little, if anything to lose (Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco and Gabon) by 
adopting a common currency. In addition, empirical findings provide some country 
comparative insights, particularly: (i) Nigeria being a more promising candidate for an AMU 
than Kenya and (ii) Zambia a better candidate than, say  Mauritius or Benin.  
 The plethora of studies in the third strand (on synthesis) are discussed in two major 
streams, notably: (i) studies that have focused on the feasibility of common currency areas 
and (ii) works that make the case for strong pegs as substitutes for monetary zones. There are 
five main studies in the first stream. They are: (1) Yehoue (2005) who  used historical data on 
trade, inflation and co-movements in output and prices to argue that an AMU would entail a 
gradual path, without necessarily leading to a continental currency. The author recommended 
regional currency blocks prior to the emergence of a continental block, mainly in: West 
Africa, Southern Africa and Central Africa. Moreover, from a trade criterion, the euro appears 
to be a good peg. (2) The concern of overlapping membership upon the initiative of monetary 
integration in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) represents a major issue for enhanced 
regional integration
2
. In an attempt to resolve the underlying concern, Buigut (2006) has 
employed cluster analysis based on nominal and real catch-up criteria. Corresponding 
convergence patterns do not confirm the case for an ESA-wide currency union. Conversely, 
two clusters in Southern and Eastern Africa are established, implying that a two-track 
currency integration course is preferable. (3) Buigut and Valev (2006) extend Buigut (2006) 
with a VAR technique for synchronising demand and supply disturbances to establish: (i) the 
existence of three sub-regional clusters and (ii) that sub-regions may be rewarded with a peg 
on the Euro. (4) The findings of Masson (2008) are broadly consistent with those of Buigut 
and Valev on selective expansion based on clusters with strong convergence in the relevant 
common policies. (5) Debrun et al. (2011) have deployed a cost-benefit assessment in Africa 
by estimating key equilibrium relationships, which allow for cross-country variations in fiscal 
                                                          
2 For instance, according to Buigut (2006), the strict implementation of a customs union by the EAC reached in 
2004 is likely to breach existing free trade agreements for SADC and COMESA.  
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revenues and inflation. The authors conclude that the EAC, ECOWAS and SADC monetary 
unions are characterised by net benefits for candidate members, though some members may 
register more losses than gains.   
 
Table 4: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed African Monetary Union 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Bayoumi & Ostry 
(1997) 
1964-1993 Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
Analysis of size and 
correlations of real 
disturbance.  
No Low levels of intra-
regional trade. 
Guillaume & Stasavage 
(2000) 
1960-1994 SSA Exploratory politico-
economic analysis.  
Yes Could lead to better 
policies. 
 1960-2000 53 African countries  Analysis of historical 
data. 
Yes/No Yes for three blocks. No 
for Africa. 
Buigut (2006) 1990-2002 EAC and SADC Cluster analysis based 
on real and monetary 
convergence.  
Yes/No  
Selective expansion.  
Buigut & Valev (2006) 1970-2002 21 Eastern and 
Southern African 
countries 
VAR technique for 
synchronising demand 
and supply disturbances.  
Yes/No  
Three clusters are feasible 
for monetary unions. 
Tsangarides et al. 
(2006) 
1948-2002 49 African countries  Tobit model. Yes Substantial trade benefits. 
Masson (2006) 1995-2000  Africa Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No Selective expansion 
Karras (2007) 1960-2000 37 African countries  Cost/Benefit analysis.  No Very heterogeneous 
benefits. 
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  AMU, COMESA, 
ECCAS, ECOWAS, 
SADC. 
Welfare gain analysis. Yes/No  
Selective expansion. 
Debrun et al. (2011) 1990-2008 ECOWAS, EAC and 
SADC 
Cost and benefit analysis 
of monetary integration  
Yes/No Selective clustering in 
regions. 
Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2015) 
1972-2006 Africa Augmented gravity 
model. 
Yes/No Conventional pegs may be 
better. 
      
Notes. SADC: Southern African Development Community. EAC: East African Community. ECOWAS: Economic Community of West 
African States. AMU: African Monetary Union. COMESA:  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. ECCAS: Economic 
Community of Central African States.  
 
  The second stream of studies in the third strand fundamentally argues that the rewards 
from fixed exchange rate regimes in Africa are comparable to benefits from monetary unions 
(see Tsangarides & Qureshi, 2015). In essence, the case for hard pegs in place of a common 
currency had previously been raised by Qureshi and Tsangarides (2012). This narrative is 
broadly consistent with the recommendations of Debrun et al. (2011) who have sustained that, 
consolidating domestic fiscal and monetary institutions is an alternative that could yield the 
same rewards as common currencies.  
 
5. Further discussion and implications   
 
 We begin this section by presenting our views on the case for pegs as an alternative to 
the currency unions discussed in the last paragraph of the preceding section. The findings of 
Debrun et al. (2011), Qureshi and Tsangarides (2012), Tsangarides and Qureshi (2015) 
contribute to the ongoing debate on regional currency formation by providing alternatives to 
currency unions. This stream of the literature steers clear of the mainstream narrative in that, 
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it is not limited to the criteria employed to classify the conclusions of studies within scope of 
this inquiry (on the feasibility of currency unions), notably: feasible (or yes), unfeasible (or 
no) or conditional feasibility/unfeasibility (yes/no). Conversely, the underlying stream 
suggests an alternative to currency unions. Hence, it somewhat deviates from the scope of 
inquiry. However, this deviation only enriches the literature by advising candidate countries 
seeking greater stability in exchange rate regimes to consider pegs as a relatively more viable 
and sustainable alternative that guarantees some margin of flexibility compared with  full 
monetary integration (Asongu, 2015).  
 The above policy prescription is quite relevant and remains open to debate because 
nations within the former French African Colonies (CFA) franc zone have not been 
exonerated from growth-inhibiting overvaluation that was a source of substantial devaluation 
in 1994 (see Fosu, 2012). It follows that, whereas a peg could mitigate volatilities in exchange 
rates, it is also likely to  damage growth and development in scenarios of overvaluation.  
 Of more serious concern is the fact that the underlying narrative is evolving when 
projects for potential AMUs are already underway. Based on our reading, the 
recommendations of this stream of the literature should not necessarily be understood as a 
case against on-going common currency efforts. In essence, authors in this subject area are 
also informing policy on the causes of the recent European Monetary Union (EMU) crisis. 
Accordingly, a strong lesson from the recent EMU crisis has been that substantial 
disequilibria in a monetary zone are the result of a currency union that is not designed to be 
robust to a plethora of macroeconomic shocks. In this light, the recommendations of Debrun 
et al. (2011) on institutional building as an alternative to currency unions is complementary, 
and not contradictory to the formation of monetary unions.  
 We have observed for the WAMU that various methodologies led to differing findings 
and recommendations. Among others, estimation strategies based on VAR/VECM have led 
authors to advise on impracticality for the most part while, those employing cointegration and 
convergence analyses have reached a Yes/No conclusion. Moreover, cluster analysis which 
has enabled authors to favour  selective expansion has also enabled initiatives to clearly 
identify countries that should not be involved in the potential WAMZ. To this end, consistent 
recommendations have been made for Nigeria to be excluded from a potential monetary 
union. For the EAMU, in addition to the common discourse of results that are  contingent on 
study-specificities already substantially engaged, we have observed that there are relatively 
more antithetical conclusions.  Findings on feasibility for the most part are based on an old 
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EAC sample that excludes Rwanda and Burundi. This is not the scenario in the SADU and 
AMU in the last-two sections because studies focusing on these regions have overwhelmingly 
concluded in favour of  conditionality feasibility (synthesis).  
 Regardless of specific monetary zones, empirical insights and stylized trends gathered 
from the studies suggest that African economies are still far-off from achieving the much 
needed macroeconomic convergence required for  potential monetary unions. Meanwhile, 
most of the studies have also been consistent with evidence of growing convergence, albeit 
the catch-up processes need to be speeded-up. While cross-country disparities in institutional 
and structural factors have been discussed quite often as potential causes of non-convergence, 
some studies (see Kuteesa, 2012) have shown that some of the reasons for the lack of 
convergence could be traceable to, inter alia: (i) very high economic performance criteria and 
(ii) lack of sustained commitment from member countries. Revising proposed benchmarks to 
realistic and accessible standards may be considered.  
 Given that catch-up varies with countries and convergence criteria, the example of 
Europe is  appropriate. This endorsement aligns with the bulk of literature advocating the 
need for selective expansion. The underlying path which is already being adopted by the 
WAMZ can seemingly be extended to the SAMU and EAMU in particular and the AMU in 
general.  
 Irrespective of potential monetary unions, convergence in stated factors and criteria 
can be enhanced by keeping inflation, debts and budget deficits in check.  Moreover, policy 
harmonization towards more economic integration and the curtailment of constraints on 
common markets would bear positively on consolidating the likelihood of sustainable 
monetary unions within the continent. Some notable recommendations that may be common 
to all embryonic zones include: (i)  engaging in adjustments aimed at aligning monetary 
policies (ii) the building effective institutions for enforcing fiscal discipline and enabling 
macroeconomic surveillance; (iii) implementing structural reforms which bridges the 
infrastructural and policy gaps ; (iv) building robust institutional arrangements for 
strengthening  fiscal, monetary and financial stability and (v) introducing a common basket 
currency in parallel with national currencies, instead of fast-tracking the process.  
 The convergence process could be further facilitated by building data collection 
capacities and the sharing of relevant information. Moreover, as suggested by Kuteesa (2012), 
harmonization of statistics would be facilitated by the consolidation of skills, competences, 
knowledge and attitudes of central bank officials from member countries. In addition to 
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addressing infrastructural difficulties, knowledge sharing and information technology gaps, 
awareness campaigns are essential to regularly improve perceptions and the advantages of the 
potential monetary unions.  
  
6. Concluding lessons 
 
 The purpose of this study has been to survey the literature focusing on potential 
African monetary unions in order to put some structure on the empirical literature and draw 
some important lessons for both academics and policymakers. We have broadly observed that 
in addition to variations in empirical strategies, sampled countries and considered 
periodicities, there is also an issue with establishing the feasibility and/or desirability of 
potential monetary unions.  Given this apparent ambiguity, this literature survey has built on 
three main scenarios, notably: feasibility (or yes), unfeasibility (or no) and conditional 
feasibility/unfeasibility (yes/no).  These scenarios have been adapted to the Hegelian 
dialectics (thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis) in various discourses.  
 The plethora of engaged studies have built on the theoretical underpinnings of optimal 
currency area (OCA) criteria and placed emphasis on correlation, cointegration, clustering and 
synchronisations, shocks and responses of, inter alia: real exchange rates, inflation, debts, 
output growth, real growth rates and terms of trade. The underlying intuition in methodology 
has been that high symmetry in the investigated factors is positively related to the need for 
common monetary policies. In this light, studies have based their recommendations on the 
existence of (i) symmetry, (ii) asymmetry and (iii) clustering of symmetry and asymmetry 
depending on adopted empirical strategies.  
Within the third suggested option, some authors have not been clear-cut on the support 
of either symmetry or asymmetry, but have provided advice that are supportive for monetary 
unions comprised of small groups of countries. Whereas the underlying third option has been 
for the most part traceable to clustering and cost/benefit methodologies, other empirical 
strategies (e.g GMM and VAR/VECM) have skewed authors to conclude in favour of  
impracticality, especially in the WAMU. Moreover, we have learnt that disaggregating panels 
into sub-samples on the one hand and distinguishing shocks from responses in the 
examination of business cycle synchronisation on the other, provides findings with more 
subtle policy implications (see narratives surrounding Angeloni & Dedola, 1999; Mkenda, 
2001; Buigut & Valev, 2005). The latter group of authors is more relevant to VAR 
approaches.   
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We briefly identify some countries that are likely to be left-out. Irrespective of 
monetary unions, the most recurrent position from findings is a selective procedure of 
monetary integration. This includes identification of clusters or direct disqualification of some 
candidate countries. For instance: (i) Nigeria’s membership in the WAMU has been 
consistently questioned (Debrun et al., 2005; Bénassy-Quéré & Coupet, 2005; Masson, 2006, 
2008; Bangaké, 2008; Coulibaly & Gnimassoun,  2013), (ii) Burundi and Rwanda (Mkenda, 
2001; Bangaké, 2008) and Rwanda (Sheik et al., 2011; Lepetit et al., 2014) are respectively 
excluded based on an old EAC or a new EAC sample, (iii) In the SAMU, joining the CMA by 
SADC members is beneficial to all, with the exception of Angola, Tanzania and Mauritius 
and a SADC-wide symmetric currency area continues to be beneficial for all, without 
Mauritius (Debrun & Masson, 2013). Moreover, a core convergence group in the CMA 
consists of Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, including, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Mauritius and Tanzania. The non-converging group includes: Angola, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia (Jefferis, 2007). (iv) 
The option of selective expansion to a monetary union is most apparent in studies assessing 
the feasibility of a continental monetary union.  
Whereas we have already discussed policies required to enhance regional integration 
for convergence in previous sections, it is important to note that absolute feasible positions 
have not been established. Even overly optimistic positions from Ogunkola (2005) are still 
balanced with a caveat that structural reforms are needed (also see Diop, 2007 on these 
reforms).  
We caution that inquiries using the same theoretical underpinnings, variables and 
methods, with the EU as reference, just by modifying the scope/context and periodicity 
examined, may only contribute to increasing the number of conflicting findings. Authors 
should place more emphasis on new perspectives and approaches based on caveats of, and 
lessons from the EMU and CFA zones 
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